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I met Fred Zacharias for the first time while visiting at Cornell Law
School in 1983. We had mutual interests. We both taught criminal law
and enjoyed watching college basketball games, especially at the thennew Carrier Dome in Syracuse, New York. We talked about teaching,
and we reminisced about our experiences as former prosecutors. Fred
was intrigued by my project to write a treatise on prosecutorial ethics
and misconduct. He did not much care for the title, Prosecutorial
Misconduct; he thought it should convey a more balanced, less slanted
approach. In retrospect, I probably should have taken his suggestion.
Balanced, thoughtful, imaginative, passionate—those were some of the
qualities that informed not only Fred’s amazing body of scholarship but
also, as I came to learn from my somewhat limited perspective, his entire
life.
As my contribution to this Memorial tribute to Professor Fred
Zacharias, I have chosen to write about Fred’s 1991 article in the
Vanderbilt Law Review entitled Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial
Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?1 I have always seen this
article as a classic, one of the finest and most important discussions of
the special role of the prosecutor in the criminal justice system and of
the meaning of the prosecutor’s ethical duty to “do justice.”2 This article
is cited repeatedly for numerous points: the conception of the
* Professor of Law, Pace Law School.
1. Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991).
2. Id. at 46.
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prosecutor’s duty not to win a case but to see that justice is done, the
failure of the do-justice ethical standard to effectively regulate the
behavior of prosecutors, the ability of prosecutors to exploit the gross
imbalance of power in the adversary system between the prosecution and
defense and the need to redress that imbalance by establishing clear
ethical guidelines for prosecutors, the articulation of a methodology to
structure prosecutorial trial ethics, and the need for drafters of codes of
professional responsibility to write meaningful rules.
The settings for Professor Zacharias’s inquiry into the duty to do
justice are the provisions in the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility.3 Well
before these codes were adopted, as Professor Zacharias points out, this
“lofty, but undefined” prosecutorial duty4 was most authoritatively
pronounced in Justice George Sutherland’s famous passage in his 1935
opinion in Berger v. United States.5 In that case the Court reversed a
federal conspiracy conviction for pervasive and persistent misconduct by
the prosecutor.6 And even before Berger’s eloquent pronouncement of
this ideal, the majestic conception of the prosecutor’s duty to promote
justice was recognized and applauded. As Professor Bruce Green,
Professor Zacharias’s longtime friend and collaborator, has observed,
courts and commentators in the nineteenth century had described the
prosecutor as a quasi-judicial official whose prodigious powers should
properly be used for beneficent and not evil purposes.7 And to the extent
that contemporary academic discourse began to focus much more

3. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2010) (describing
prosecutors as “minister[s] of justice”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13
(1986) (“[The prosecutor’s] duty is to seek justice . . . .”).
4. See Zacharias, supra note 1, at 47 n.6.
5. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
6. This passage is cited so often as to become an iconic statement of the role of
the prosecutor:
[He] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation
to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to
use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
Id.
7. Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 607, 612 (1999) (citing several model rules and commentary, Professor Green
observes that the concept of a prosecutor’s duty to “seek justice” or “do justice” dates
back well over a century).
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extensively and creatively on the prosecutor’s duty to do justice,8 it is
abundantly clear that Professor Zacharias’s groundbreaking article was
not only the catalyst for this doctrinal development but also the most
authoritative and substantive discussion of the meaning of justice.
As one of its several objectives, Professor Zacharias’s article
attempted to clarify the “justice” to which the modern codes refer. He
suggested two fairly limited prongs: first, that a prosecutor must have a
good faith belief in the defendant’s guilt and second, that a prosecutor
must ensure the functioning of the basic elements of the adversary
system.9 However, except for a few continuing responsibilities of a
prosecutor—refraining from prosecuting unsupported charges, ensuring
that the accused has an opportunity to exercise procedural rights, and
making some disclosures of information10—the codes offer no guidance
on specific obligations that constitute a doing of justice in the setting of
an adversarial trial.11 To be sure, as Professor Zacharias observes, the
codes are concerned with structuring adversarial practice, and the codes
“do not exempt prosecutors from the requirements of zealous
advocacy.”12 Therefore, as Professor Zacharias suggests, “‘Justice’ must
have a special interpretation in the context of the adversary system.”13
8. See, e.g., Kenneth Bresler, Pretty Phrases: The Prosecutor as Minister of
Justice and Administrator of Justice, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1301, 1305 (1996); R.
Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a
Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty To “Seek Justice,” 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 637 (2006);
Brandon K. Crase, When Doing Justice Isn’t Enough: Reinventing the Guidelines for
Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 478 (2007); Green, supra note
7, at 612; Samuel J. Levine, Taking Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously: A Consideration of
the Prosecutor’s Ethical Obligation To “Seek Justice” in a Comparative Analytical
Framework, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (2004); Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as
Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84
WASH. L. REV. 35, 61 (2009); Melanie D. Wilson, Prosecutors “Doing Justice” Through
Osmosis—Reminders To Encourage a Culture of Cooperation, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67,
85 (2008).
9. Zacharias, supra note 1, at 49.
10. Id. at 51 n.24.
11. Id. at 51 (“All modern codes are silent on the meaning of justice at trial.”).
12. Id. at 52.
13. Id. at 53. Professor Zacharias respected prosecutors and the work they do. In
other articles he sought to identify both the scope and excesses of their duty to do justice
dispassionately and accurately. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining,
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121 (1998). Fred was a bit impatient with critics—including
me—who lamented the absence of professional discipline of prosecutors. He believed
that the claim was somewhat overblown. In another often-cited article, Professor Zacharias
examines carefully and impartially the issues surrounding bar discipline of prosecutors and
concludes, with characteristic integrity, that bar discipline has not been completely
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With creativity and inspiration, Professor Zacharias sets out to provide
concrete meaning to the amorphous concept of a prosecutor’s mandate to
promote adversarial justice. Professor Zacharias’s principal objective
may be to encourage code drafters to take a serious look at the conduct
of criminal trials and to clearly articulate ethical prosecutorial behavior.
I suggest may be because I believe Fred may not have been overly
sanguine that code drafters would possess the fortitude or willingness to
engage in this task. More likely, Fred sought to challenge the conventional
understanding that doing justice was entirely within the realm of
prosecutorial discretion and an obligation that prosecutors could and
should intuit depending on the situation.
How should a prosecutor attempt to preserve the adversarial balance?
According to Professor Zacharias, a prosecutor should intervene when
defense counsel’s performance is deficient.14 A prosecutor should not
impede defense counsel’s access to all discoverable and disclosable
information.15 A prosecutor should intervene, or at least not remain passive,
when the trial judge demonstrates hostility towards the defense.16 And a
prosecutor should avoid using inadmissible evidence.17 Undoubtedly, as
Professor Zacharias well knew, each of these situations is much more
than controversial; Professor Zacharias’s proposals at a minimum reflect
outside-the-box thinking that likely would make any prosecutor—even
the most conscientious—cringe. Indeed, reconciling these proposed
actions with a prosecutor’s duty of “zealous advocacy” requires a mindset
that, quite frankly, no prosecutor likely possesses. To be sure, intervening
when defense counsel is incompetent or the judge is biased may make
abundant sense to some prosecutors, but not with the purpose of doing
justice. Rather, to the conscientious prosecutor, such intervention might
be called for to preserve a likely guilty verdict from appellate reversal.
Moreover, as Professor Zacharias correctly observes, refraining from
using inadmissible evidence is a worthy objective to preserve adversarial
balance, but often the question of admissibility is unclear, and for many
prosecutors it is typically the judge’s call. Also laudable for purposes of
ensuring justice, as Professor Zacharias notes, is not impeding defense
counsel’s access to relevant information, but that objective may seem far
less pressing today when viewed in the much more common practice of
prosecutors’ conduct in deliberately suppressing relevant and truthful
absent but “[n]either has it fulfilled its commitment to maintaining the letter and spirit of
the codes.” See Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C.
L. REV. 721, 778 (2001).
14. Zacharias, supra note 1, at 66–74.
15. Id. at 79–85.
16. Id. at 85–88.
17. Id. at 88–90.

154

[VOL. 48: 151, 2011]

The Zealous Prosecutor
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

information that is favorable to the defense and quite possibly would
exculpate an innocent defendant.
Fred was a romantic. Achieving adversarial justice when the system
breaks down, as the above examples illustrate, reflects Professor Zacharias’s
faith that the adversarial system has the capacity to correct itself and that
prosecutors have the courage and integrity to step out of their purely
adversarial roles and ensure that justice is done. Prosecutors, he believed,
can be encouraged to compete properly and fairly as both zealous advocates
and ministers of justice in order to establish the essential adversarial
balance. And, if they fail or are unable to achieve that mission, then
code drafters, by enacting clear and explicit rules, can discourage
prosecutors from taking undue advantage of their built-in resources.
Fred understood clearly that prosecutors typically make difficult
judgment calls in broad gray areas and that telling prosecutors to act
noncompetitively may only complicate their self-image.18 Fred also
understood that enacting explicit ethical requirements that are widely
disobeyed may do more harm than good in fostering cynicism and
encouraging further disobedience.19 As Professor Zacharias correctly
notes, no prosecutor has ever been disciplined for failing to do justice at
trial.20 However, attempting to make somewhat more explicit an ethical
mandate that is maddeningly vague and frustratingly amorphous has
considerable merit; if nothing else, it teaches judges, lawyers, other
participants in the adversary system, and the general public as well, the
meaning of adversarial justice and what the legal profession expects of
prosecutors. Even if the codes continue to resist giving content to the
do-justice requirement, as Fred likely expected, his seminal vision of the
appropriate conduct of a prosecutor in striving to do justice illuminates
the empty rhetoric in the codes and offers those who continue to be
educated and inspired by Fred’s scholarship an honorable and dramatic
alternative.

18.
19.
20.

Id. at 103.
See id. at 104.
Id. at 105.
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